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CHAPTER 10
“Politics Without Politics”: Affordances 




The “solidarity economy” (SE) is understood in France as a form of 
Walzer’s “critical associationism”. For Walzer, democracy is consubstantial 
with association: “the civility that makes democratic politics possible can 
only be learned in associational networks” (1992: 104). Bringing entre-
preneurs, producers and consumers together as citizens in the same asso-
ciation whose goals are collectively determined, the solidarity economy 
even seems to embody at a local scale the industrial democracy that the 
author calls for (Walzer 1983: 301–303). Taking up this Walzerian per-
spective, solidarity economy specialists write that it constructs a “positive 
ideology”, one where the interests of citizens are brought together locally 
to negotiate a collective meaning. “The dramatic expansion of associative 
practices makes it possible to foresee the change of the workers’ move-
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ment’s motto, ‘all power to workers’ (…) into all power to associated citi-
zens” (Caillé 2003: 323, see also Laville and Salmon 2016: 145–162).
Some authors, such as Habermas, even think that the local political 
significance of these organisations should naturally lead to a more global 
level of organisation (1985). But over the 15 years during which I have 
been observing the field of SE, I have seen these organisations experience 
great difficulty in federating at national and international levels. How can 
we explain these difficulties? While most of these organisations do undeni-
ably have civic ambitions, the question of their political institutionalisation 
has to be raised. Even though it is widely agreed that each local solidarity 
economy organisation is ontologically political because it represents the 
interests of citizens in the local political field, there is no satisfactory answer 
to this “meta political organisation” question in the existing literature on 
the solidarity economy.
To help answer this question, the chapter will be split into four stages.
First, I will summarise my theoretical framework—which draws on the 
pragmatic sociology of Boltanski and Thévenot and its notion of “gram-
mar”, borrowed from Wittgenstein—to bring to light the specific oppor-
tunities and challenges thrown up by the solidarity economy. I focus on 
the problems raised for the construction of an overarching political iden-
tity and governance capable of challenging traditional political structures 
such as parties and trade unions.
Secondly, I draw on texts produced by analysts and actors in the solidar-
ity economy to examine how they have problematised the task facing 
them. On the one hand, I will show how these actors articulate the onto-
logical political dimension of the solidarity economy in a way that brings 
it close to the civil society argument of Walzer’s critical associationism. On 
the other hand, I will examine how they present the solidarity economy as 
a critique of far-left modes of organisation. That critique can be under-
stood as a revival of the libertarian socialist tradition of the French Marxist 
philosophers Castoriadis (1974 [1959]) and Lefort (1979 [1958]), which 
is cited as a European anarchist tradition opposed to American 
Libertarianism by Chomsky (2013: 19 and 30) and represented today by 
Holloway (and also to some extent by Graeber and by Chomsky himself), 
among others. More precisely, I will argue that there are overlaps between 
the justification and argumentation of Castoriadis, Lefort and Holloway, 
and that of researchers and key actors in the solidarity economy. Using 
pragmatic sociology, I will show that these philosophers provide the rules 











































the solidarity economy which is “libertarian socialist”. By employing this 
grammar, participants in the solidarity economy seek to marginalise and 
disenfranchise far-left political parties and trade unions, which they argue 
“only denounce without acting”.
But we will also see that, while this critique can be formulated from 
within the socialist libertarian language, the way in which actors deploy 
this language’s grammar proves problematic and brings about real ten-
sions. This is what the third stage of analysis—which is concerned with 
how this grammar operates in the field—reveals. The interviews from 
which I quote elicited solidarity economy actors’ memories of the recent 
past. I analyse two political struggles for representation between two com-
peting umbrella organisations, MES (Solidarity Economy Movement) and 
Les Pénélopes, both of which bring together solidarity economy initia-
tives. Analysing these organisations’ justifications, I show how they indeed 
talk the same language structured by the same libertarian socialist gram-
mar. I then attend to the question of why, despite being manifestations of 
the same grammar, these organisations fight each other and do not man-
age to agree on a common political medium of representation that would 
allow them to gain a powerful political voice. I will argue that certain 
features internal to this grammar itself give rise to tensions and conflicts 
that can act as barriers to the construction of a meta-level political identity. 
And that this illustrates a common organisational problem encountered 
not only by libertarian socialist activists since the 19th century but also by 
the broader anti-globalisation movement today (Frère and Reinecke 2011; 
Frère 2018).
In my fourth and final stage of analysis (discussion), I will focus on 
some other features of the formal “libertarian socialist grammar” elabo-
rated by the theorists mentioned above. My hypothesis is that actors’ over-
looking of these features may help us understand problems in their use of 
their own grammar and, incidentally, why a meta-democratic system—a 
system that would give citizens a real voice capable of addressing govern-
ments, trade unions and other public figures—is absent from the grass-
roots. In light of this analysis, I will then try to answer the question at the 
heart of this chapter: Does the solidarity economy really provide a new 
way of doing politics, as Walzer suggests? Or is it another manifestation of 
“virtual reality”, as Žižek calls it, which is essentially a “Politics without 
politics”: a kind of political thought deprived of its “malignant property” 
like a whole series of products on the market: “coffee without caffeine, 
cream without fat, beer without alcohol…” (Žižek 1991: LXXVI)?









































What Is the Solidarity Economy?
The focus of this chapter is the solidarity economy, a widely-used term 
whose most common French equivalent is l’économie solidaire. I prefer this 
term over “social economy”, “solidarity-based economy” or “Third Sector”. 
On the one hand, unlike the Third Sector, many solidarity economy initia-
tives have a commercial dimension and operate on the economic market 
(like Community Supported Agriculture [CSA] and micro- finance). This 
contrasts with charities, which are run by largely middle- class people for the 
benefit of unemployed or poor people. On the other hand, some solidarity 
economy initiatives, such as the Local Exchange Trading System (LETS), 
reject the official currency issued by central banks and introduce a new 
egalitarian currency based on local exchange. This suggests an alternative or 
a parallel economy (with an alternative money form). So “social economy” 
must also be avoided because it leads us to think either that all of these 
organisations are based on the usual market economy (like regular workers’ 
cooperatives, mutual insurance schemes) or that they aim to construct a 
Third Sector alongside the public sector and market capitalism (Defourny 
et al. 2009). The term “solidarity economy”, by contrast, suggests that all 
of these organisations belong to a specific alternative economy that aims to 
replace capitalism—one that seeks to eradicate a pure market sphere con-
trolled by private shareholders rather than by citizens organised democrati-
cally (Davidson 2008; Frère 2009; Frère and Reinecke 2011; Lemaître and 
Hemlsing 2012; Bauhardt 2014; Saguize and Brent 2017)
Solidarity economy initiatives can be placed in one of the following four 
categories (Laville 2009) (examples are drawn from France):
 1. Micro-credit and savings make up the first category. These include 
organisations such as Garrigue in France, which is different to the 
famous “Grameen Bank” (Bangladesh). Garrigue helps to finance 
the above-mentioned micro-companies set up by and for unem-
ployed workers. But it only invests in cooperatives, does not issue 
dividends and demands that benefits be redistributed among work-
ers. These organisations usually work with bodies such as commu-
nity services consultancies to support small-scale ventures launched 
by the unemployed which are in need of management guidance and 









































 2. Initiatives for non-monetary exchange make up a second category. In 
France, these mostly take the form of Local Exchange Trading 
Systems (LETS), that is, community-based groups exchanging goods 
and services among themselves using vouchers or other designated 
accounting units to balance internal transactions. Their operation 
may include services such as non-monetised swaps of decorating ser-
vices, language lessons or childcare. Some poorly-off participants 
subsist almost entirely on such swaps and service exchanges (Frase 
and Parry 2001; Peacock 2006; Westra 2016).
 3. A third category comprises parallel local food distribution networks, 
namely products from organic farming and fair trade distribution. 
That is, in France, networks such as AMAP1 for assisting Community 
Supported Agriculture. In these cases, the economy of scale neces-
sary to pay those producers who wish to produce high-quality 
unprocessed food can only be achieved through voluntary invest-
ments. Participants share the tasks of running these cooperatives 
and give their time for free as unsalaried managers (Cone and Myhre 
2000; Booth and Coveney 2015; Weschenfelder et al. 2016).
 4. The fourth category is that of so-called community services (Services 
de proximité), a term widely used for the last 30 years to refer to 
initiatives such as neighbourhood cooperatives. Community service 
organisations include providers of everyday support such as help for 
older people; urban initiatives such as communitarian restaurants 
and public space improvement groups; hobbyists’ networks and 
other leisure-time and cultural organisations; and environmental ini-
tiatives such as local recycling. These initiatives are usually estab-
lished by consulting services such as the Pôles d’économie solidaire 
(Solidarity economy centres), which bring together professionals and 
voluntary workers whose aim is to launch local businesses with one 
or more “alternative” features rather than being exclusively profit- 
driven (Laville and Nyssens 2000; Petrella 2001; Soria and Mitchell 
2016). These consulting services will be our concern here.
What Is a Grammar?
Following French pragmatic sociology, a grammar can be understood as a 
set of rules that forms the basis of people’s judgments about their own 
experience. These rules underpin how people justify their own actions 
(Boltanski and Thévenot 2006 [1991]). Pragmatic sociology uses a 






































“grammatical approach” that starts from what people say when they are 
justifying their actions and identifies the building blocks that structure 
what they express. In contrast to the structuralist approach, the justifica-
tion approach seeks to show the convergence between grammar and data 
(speech) by starting from people’s own experience and from the reflexive 
relationship they have with that experience (through argumentation), 
instead of starting from an external point of view. A grammar is a way of 
representing the world, a state of mind that provides and is manifested in 
justifications that preclude other unwanted representations (Boltanski 
2009; Frère and Jaster 2018).
To emphasise the non-technical nature of a grammar and contrast it to 
a structuralist approach, I propose to understand it in a Wittgensteinian 
sense, as a language game. Here the term language game is meant to high-
light the fact that speaking language is part of an activity. “To imagine a 
language game means to imagine a form of life” (2001 [1953]: 19/7e). 
In a language game, the grammar becomes a sense-making device that 
renders a situation intelligible and meaningful. It does so precisely by 
organising elements according to a particular system of grammatical rules. 
“Grammar tells what kind of object anything is” (2001 [1953]: 373/99e, 
see also Cervera-Marzal and Frère, Forthcoming). Living in and speaking 
about the world according to a grammar is about mastering a language 
game, rather than about compliance with Durkheimian social rules or a 
Bourdieusian Embodied Habitus provided by the social order (Frère 
2004). A grammar is both enabling and constraining. Grammatical rules 
are resources for people’s language, while at the same time they draw its 
boundaries by prescribing a specific way of speaking. For example, two 
artists from two different artistic traditions, facing the same reality, would 
not speak the same language in their works and would not offer the same 
representation. To invoke Wittgenstein once again: it is possible to shift 
from one grammar to another, to find a new way of speaking, “a new way 
of looking at things” (which “might even be called a new sensation”) “as 
if you had invented a new way of painting [the situation]” (2001 [1953]: 
400–401/103e).
A grammar must not be understood as an external structure forced 
upon action through socially internalised norms. These rules of action are 
not unconscious—they do not act as a form of censorship, nor are they in 
opposition to the actors’ own justifications of their actions (as suggested 
by a Bourdieusian understanding of social action, for instance). In most 











































(Boltanski 2012 [1990]: 37–40). Contra Bourdieu, the sociologist is no 
longer seen as the only one with the ability to highlight the determina-
tions that supposedly drive social actors’ behaviours because these deter-
minations are embodied as habitus and therefore hidden from these actors’ 
own reflexivity (Bourdieu 1987). Within the pragmatic sociology 
paradigm—which shares common ground with Latour’s Actor-Network- 
Theory approach (2005; Guggenheim and Potthast 2011)—sociologists 
“abandon their belief that their interpretations carry more weight than 
those of social actors” and instead attempt “to clarify the words used by 
actors to justify their actions because actors themselves do not have the 
time to do so” (Frère 2004).
Pragmatic sociology, therefore, problematises the object of sociological 
enquiry. It is based on the assumption that ordinary people have the com-
petence to critically reflect on their own actions (or on the actions of oth-
ers) and provide judgement and justification.
A grammar is a condition of legitimacy as it limits the possibilities of 
justification and action if one wants to be recognised within a particular 
moral or political order. Trying to formalise a grammar of justification can 
also help us understand how ideology can have an effect within the practi-
cal organisation of social lives. To elicit a grammar of justification means 
understanding how actors engage in social struggles by using the princi-
ples of political philosophy and ideology to argue.
Data
The data presented in the following analysis is drawn from a larger research 
project on the solidarity economy and anti-globalisation movement that 
has been running since 2002. I used pragmatic sociology to study argu-
mentations “in action” and follow actors and theorists on the ground. I 
then worked outwards to understand the meta-level syntax on which local 
action in the field was based. I first used textual data: 300 texts written by 
actors and theorists about their commitment to the social movement (arti-
cles in journals, magazines and collections connected to the solidarity 
economy2). Some of them were written by members of the CRIDA 
(Centre de Recherche et d’Information sur la Démocratie et l’Autonomie), 
an “action-research” centre affiliated to the MES. Within these reflexive 
texts, what I call the solidarity economy’s “libertarian socialist grammar of 
praxis” is used by both actors and sociologists (against the Far Left), as I 
will show here. We will see how a common libertarian socialist representa-






































tion of what political organisation in the solidarity economy would look 
like emerges in these actors’ language games. In line with how Boltanski 
and Thévenot represent their grammars of justification—as rooted in clas-
sical moral philosophies whose features reappear in actors’ common 
sense—I have drawn out the philosophical contents of recurrent themes 
and values found in the empirical material and have looked for their ideal 
articulation in theoretical texts about the solidarity economy. I find strong 
parallels with Lefort and Castoriadis’ work on the 1960s workers’ social 
movement in France and a classical content analysis (Titscher et al. 2000) 
reveals how much the grammar of the solidarity economy owes to their 
influence in the history of French political thought, as well as to the con-
temporary thought of libertarian socialists and anarchists such as Graeber, 
Chomsky and Holloway.
The rest of my empirical material consists of data from participant 
observation and interviews. During the qualitative field study—the first 
stage of research about the solidarity economy—organisations were 
selected from each of the four sectors listed earlier: micro-finance, LETS, 
community services consultancies and Community Supported Agriculture. 
In each of the 25 selected organisations, which are located in seven of the 
bigger French cities (Paris, Lyon, Marseille, Toulouse, Caen, Lille, Dijon), 
I conducted participant observation sessions lasting between three days 
and a week. Within each of these organisations, between one and six semi- 
structured interviews (depending on the organisation’s size) were con-
ducted to account for the voices of people holding different positions (a 
total of 75 interviews). These lasted for an hour and a half on average and 
were concerned with how people understood their own action within the 
solidarity economy—both in the present and during the last decade. 
Interview transcripts and field notes were systematically coded. Half of 
these organisations were affiliated with the MES. The other half were affil-
iated with smaller networks, including Les Pénélopes.
Both the MES and Les Pénélopes are networks of associations that try 
to create a federation of solidarity economy initiatives. The main differ-
ence is that Les Pénélopes—a Paris-based cooperative whose name refers 
to the wife of Ulysses in Greek mythology3—focuses on women’s initia-
tives (its main activity is to support and link together women’s solidarity 
economy initiatives around the world) and its network is concerned with 
causes beyond the solidarity economy, such as feminist movements. It has 
a website and publishes an online magazine concerned with the solidarity 









































Pénélopes, I have chosen to focus on those with the president (Martha) 
and with a Médiasol employee (Roger4). To analyse the contestations 
around Médiasol, I contrast the account of representatives from Les 
Pénélopes with those of two MES members: Monique, the president, and 
Marcel, a member of the Executive Committee, who are also both direc-
tors from two community services consultancies.
THE LEXICAL ANALYSIS OF THE GRAMMAR
The Politics of Everyday Life
A common claim about new social movements such as the present-day 
anti-globalisation campaign is that involvement in their many-faceted ini-
tiatives is political: the solidarity economy is an opportunity to claim that 
traditional political parties and trade unions do not represent the only way 
to engage in or practise politics, as Martha, one of Les Pénélopes’ leaders, 
explained during an interview:
We have to go beyond a political definition of politics to open it up to 
other practices that are not recognised as belonging to politics or to legiti-
mate citizenship even though they lie at the very heart of the institution of 
a common world in our everyday lives.
In the same spirit, a solidarity economy researcher (from the CRIDA) writes:
It is not only the “official political organisations” (such as the National 
Assembly and other places where laws and rules are created by the city’s 
political representatives) that prevail but also smaller organisations, the 
whole civic and local arena, in which arguments about everyday concerns 
are discussed and weighed up by social actors. The rules and laws of micro 
public space “are not only those that are offered by established systems, they 
result from a rationality that belongs to discussion, argumentation and the 
procedural rationality developed in micro public spaces”.5
Occasional help with everyday tasks, the exchange of services in neigh-
bourhoods (fixing the plumbing, minding children, etc.), in short all those 
activities that are part of community services (whether or not they are 
already embedded within an “official” cooperative as in the LETS) tend 
not to be seen as political because they constitute a “modest, ordinary 
form of citizenship” (id.). However, what is at stake is far more than a 


































mere survival strategy: there is a need to recognise a public space in which 
we are in connection with each other—one that is structured and managed.
In other words, conceived of as many micro public spaces, solidarity 
economy associations are depicted as almost unwittingly answering the 
political question par excellence: “Given our inclination to live together, 
how best can we organise our shared life in the city” (Aristotle 2007: 58, 
book 3, ch. 6, 1278b. See also page 3, book 1, ch. 2, 1253a)?
Professionals from community services consultancies, who provide active 
support for project founders, claim that their commitment to the solidarity 
economy is a “political commitment” through their rejection of any form 
of exclusion, inequality, degradation of the environment and of our living 
conditions, and of a single model of development imposed on all. This com-
mitment aims at defending weaker social groups, at promoting a more 
direct and participatory democracy, at restoring principles of equality in 
the decision-making process and at social justice.6
As Warren (2000) has observed, the potential for political engagement 
is inscribed in the types of actions these initiatives carry out, which are 
unconstrained by formal rules, and the possibility of a renewed belief in 
democracy. Experience in a cooperative is a source of political awareness in 
itself since the association is a school for citizenship which expects its 
members to exercise choice and commit themselves to the “city”. In this 
sense, the solidarity economy is seen by researchers as an infra-political 
social movement (Spicer and Böhm 2007).
What emerges here, according to pragmatic sociology, is a specific order 
of justification/argumentation. This can be compared to a grammatical 
system—the rules of a language game—because it imposes restrictions on 
which terms may legitimately be used as subjects and objects (1), qualifi-
ers/adjectives (2) and verbs designating relationships (3) (Boltanski and 
Thévenot 2006 [1991]: 140). Thus, the language games of researchers 
and actors are conducted using the terms “micro public spaces” (1), 
“ordinary citizen” (1), “local arena” (1), “political commitment” (2), 
“direct democracy” (2), “equality in the decision-making process” (2), to 
defend the unemployed (3), to take part (3), to exercise choice (3), and so 
on. These are opposed to terms such as “political definition of politics”, 
“State”, “big politics” and “representative democracy”. These words are 
meant to convey a specific representation of action in the world that struc-







































the solidarity economy experience and have a common way of talking 
about it, a common language game: what they seek to articulate is a new 
democratic style of politics.
The Critique of the Far Left
The MES is an umbrella networking organisation that seeks to coordinate 
local-level initiatives. Its members all belong to the four categories of asso-
ciation described above (see introduction). Within the MES, actors insist 
that the solidarity economy is inherently anti-capitalist because action is 
based on cooperation.
MES people are convinced that in LETS (and so on) lie natural alterna-
tives. This is why their affiliates have often made a point of attending 
events such as the World Social Forum (in Porto Alegre) and the European 
Social Forum (in Paris, London or Athens) that have been held in recent 
years, even if they fear that these new political organisations might already 
have been co-opted by political parties and trade unions.
For example, MES calls for a Village de l’économie solidaire to be part of 
the Paris Fora (2003), expressing this fear and suggesting that only a natu-
ral and libertarian confluence of associations can protect against it. Once 
again, the grammar of justification is anti-authoritarian:
The president of the MES, Monique, complains in an article: This call to 
resistance, this wave of interest in civil society for social forums “naturally 
breeds envy. We can see new apparatchiks pop up who would like to 
control the movement in the interest of particular chapters. They are 
only interested in the movement insofar as they see it as a fishing pond for 
activists, not as something with intrinsic worth. This tension can keenly be 
felt in the ESF, first in Florence, then in Paris-St-Denis. The Revolutionary 
Communist League (LCR7) calls for the Local Social Forum, the French 
Communist Party (PCF) and related associations (the major trade unions 
such as CGT8) are everywhere to be seen (…). Trade union employees try 
to control the secretariat of the organisation, i.e. the forum’s organising 
body that meets once a week (…) Forums are wavering between the tradi-
tion of the International Workers’Association and the Leninist [and 
Trotskyite] tradition. On both a global and a national level the Leninist 
influence remains very difficult to eradicate and still hampers creativity and 
thus the possibility of constructing political alternatives”.9




































The MES’ objective is to turn the solidarity economy into the concrete 
basis for a practical proposed alternative form of globalisation that can be 
set against neocommunist organisations and their abstract criticisms of 
capitalism. Even though the solidarity economy stands in the same oppo-
sitional relation to capitalism, it maintains that neocommunist organisa-
tions have failed to develop any genuine revolutionary praxis. From a 
solidarity point of view, the Trotskyite Far Left—such as the Revolutionary 
Communist League (LCR; today the New Anticapitalist Party, NPA) in 
France—has failed to come up with any new proposal beyond blaming the 
government, the state and now the European Commission in Brussels. Its 
only concern has been to denounce capitalism and seize power without 
translating this into action. Its commitment is to words alone (Boltanski 
1999 [1993]), which serve to relieve moral anxieties without in any way 
lessening the plight of those who are excluded.
Many, if not all, proponents of the solidarity economy agree in defining 
solidarity praxis in opposition to the Far Left. For them economic action 
is essential. But as it focuses on action, attention is turned away from the 
task of shaping a visible identity.
The MES is an absolute political necessity that represents the bringing 
together of social actors; it plays the part of an initiator, a gatekeeper, and 
this raises the issue of alliances (with NGOs, elected representatives etc.). 
The forum model no longer suits us because we must no longer function 
with classical forms of representation. We need a horizontal redevelop-
ment that allows local citizens to speak anywhere and at any time in the 
name of the solidarity economy.10
Such political vocabulary no longer requires the classical forms of activ-
ist legitimation such as those traditionally provided by political parties, 
trade unions or, in a more general way, federation.
Another researcher writes that:
what should be retained from the current crisis of “big” politics is the 
greater independence that cooperative action enjoys from far-left political 
parties, and probably also a weakened distinction between the intellectual 
and the activist within civil society. What might become possible is the 
 presence of the subordinate classes in the public sphere, freed from struc-





































Once again, we can see the vocabulary characteristic of a language 
game operating according to a specific grammar: “horizontal redevelop-
ment”, “new proposal” and “praxis”. A political ideology gives rise to a 
shared representation of the world governed by specific lexical rules. These 
rules exclude the usage of words such as “parties”, “trade unions”, “struc-
tures of representation”, “federation” and “verbal protest”.
Philosophical Expression of the Grammar
My hypothesis is that all the solidarity economy actors and researchers 
respect the same grammar of justification. This grammar is “libertarian” in 
the socialist sense of French philosopher Claude Lefort (1979: 14–15), 
rather than in the individualist definition of Nozick (1974). As early as the 
1950s, Lefort gave content and meaning to what was then the fashionable 
vocabulary of “participation” and “network” in France. As the co-founder 
of the unorthodox Marxist organisation known as Socialisme ou Barbarie 
(Socialism or Barbarism12) with the philosopher/psychoanalyst Castoriadis, 
his goal was to forge what were known as self-management initiatives 
among militant French factory workers. “What S or B was to accomplish 
(which Marx had not achieved) was to delve into workers’ everyday lives 
so as to determine their actual political content rather than what was 
projected onto them. Marx described the proletariat in such a dark way 
that it becomes difficult to envisage how its members might develop any 
consciousness of their material conditions and rise towards a leadership 
role. Capitalism has deprived it of its full physical, moral, political and 
human character” (Lefort 1979 [1958]: 73).
In contrast, according to Lefort and Castoriadis, we must look at the 
deprived and abject conditions in which workers live for the potential to 
act politically. “Politics is not something to be taught, it is rather what has 
to be brought out from its latent inscription within workers’ lives and 
behaviours” (Lefort 1979 [1958]: 104). The creativity and inventiveness 
of local events or collectives will generate its own praxis. “The workers’ 
movement will only find its way if it breaks away from the notion of party 
or any centralised instance to find its specific forms of action in multiple 
groups of activists who freely organise their actions and whose contacts, 
mutual information and connections make for both a confrontation and a 
commonality of experience” (1979 [1958]: 113).
It has been shown how this libertarian socialist grammar is deeply rooted 
in the anarcho-syndicalist tradition and, more specifically, in the work of 
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Proudhon, who opposed the state socialism that Marxists would defend 
from the third quarter of the 19th century (Frère 2018). Today, as Day 
(2005) argues, this grammar is mobilised by new theorists such as Holloway, 
who focus on praxis rather than protest. “To begin to think about power 
and changing the world without taking power (or indeed anything else) we 
need to start from doing” (Holloway 2002: 27). To reclaim emancipatory 
practices in this way first of all requires that we no longer rely too heavily on 
the “party” form, which Holloway critiques both in the sections about 
Lukacs (2002: Ch. 6) and in those about the state (Ch. 1).
The party form, whether vanguardist or parliamentary, presupposes 
an orientation towards the state and makes little difference without it. The 
party is in fact a way of disciplining the class struggle, of subordinating the 
myriad forms class struggle takes to the overriding aim of gaining control 
of the state. A fixed hierarchy of struggles is usually expressed in the form 
of the party programme. This instrumentalist impoverishment of struggle 
is not characteristic of particular parties or tendencies (Stalinism, 
Trotskyism, Leninism [128–13213], etc.): it is inherent in the idea that 
the movement’s goal is to conquer political power. To move beyond par-
ties, we have to think “of an anti-politics of events rather than a politics of 
organization. Or better, think of organization not in terms of being but 
in term of doing (…). The shift from a politics of organization to a politics 
of events is already taking place” but is usually not seen (Holloway 2002: 
214, see also Chomsky 2013: 5–20).
For Holloway, politics is everywhere in everyday life, but television, 
newspapers and politicians’ speeches give little indication of the existence of 
this micro-level infra-politics. “For them, politics is the politics of power, 
political conflict is about winning power, political reality is the reality of 
power. For them, anti-power is invisible. Look more closely however, look 
at the world around us, look beyond the newspapers, look beyond the 
political parties, beyond the institutions of the labour movement and 
you can see a world of struggle: the autonomous municipalities in Chiapas, 
the students in the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, the 
Liverpool Dockers”, and so on. (Holloway 2002: 155–156). We should add 
the solidarity economy.14 “Anti-power is in the dignity of everyday exis-
tence” (2002: 158).15 As Chomsky writes, “the problem that is set for our 
time is that of freeing man from the curse of economic exploitation and 
political and social enslavement; and the method isn’t the conquest and 
exercise of state power, nor stultifying parliamentarianism, but rather to 










































In the book in which he illustrates “doing” concretely by develop-
ing the idea of what he calls “cracks”, Holloway shows how (as is well 
known today) the horizontal organisation of resistance to capitalism is 
the horizontal network: “The pursuit of autonomy involves a nomadic 
moving between or creating of these transient zones of freedom and 
intensity of experience. The link between these zones is provided by 
the Web, ‘the alternate horizontal open structure of info-change, the 
non-hierarchic network’” (Holloway 2010: 33). The “network form 
is not new. It was the form adopted by the libertarian socialist councils, 
by the workers of the Paris Commune, by the anarchists during the 
Spanish civil war, and more recently seen in the Zapatistas’ communal 
councils, the cabildos in Bolivia, the asambleas barriales in Argentina 
and the forms of horizontal (or anti-vertical) organization adopted by 
groups all over the world. These are non-instrumental forms of organi-
zation that focus on articulating the opinions of all those involved in 
the struggles, working outwards from there rather than backwards 
from the goal to be achieved. The council, then, is quite different 
from the party, which is a form of organization conceived as a means 
to an end, the end of gaining state power (2010: 40)”. And, Holloway 
concludes, “all of this expresses the rejection of representative democ-
racy as a form of organization that excludes the represented. All the 
organisational forms that we have mentioned can be seen as develop-
ments of direct democracy, not as a set of rules but as a constant pro-
cess of experimenting with democratic forms, ways of overcoming 
people’s inhibitions, ways of controlling people’s aggressions or sexist 
or racist assumptions” (2010: 44).
This is clearly reminiscent of the anarchist principle of decision by 
consensus suggested by Graeber. “Behind all good consensus process is 
that one should not even try to convert others to one’s overall point of 
view; the point of consensus process is to allow a group to decide on a 
common course of action. Instead of voting proposals up and down, 
then, proposals are worked and reworked, scotched or reinvented, until 
one ends up with something everyone can live with” (Graeber 2004: 
84–85). This is an older form of democracy than the kind we usually 
associate with the term. Quoting Castoriadis’ critique of representative 
democracy, Graeber concludes that “it was only once the term ‘democ-
racy’ could be almost completely transformed to incorporate the princi-
ple of representation (…) that it was rehabilitated in the eyes of the 
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well-born political theorists, and took on the meaning it has today” 
(2004: 91–92). And Chomsky argues that libertarian socialism in 
Europe, contra US Libertarianism, has retained that direct and horizon-
tal idea of democracy. As he writes: “it meant, and always meant to me, 
an antistate branch of socialism, which meant a highly organized society, 
nothing to do with chaos, but based on democracy all the way through. 
That means democratic control of communities, of workplaces, of fed-
eral structures, built on systems of voluntary association spreading inter-
nationally. That’s traditional anarchism” (2013: 107).
As we can see, the libertarian socialist grammars of Graeber, Chomsky, 
Holloway, Lefort and Castoriadis are as similar to each other as to that of 
the solidarity economy actors. They all respect the same rules of the same 
language game to talk about their world. Theirs are praxis-based (“doing”-
based) grammars that privilege the use of terms such as horizontal politi-
cal participation, direct democracy, democratic equality, a natural 
sense of the political, local public space, the political content of every-
day life, local events, communities and voluntary association. Their 
grammars also reject the use of the same words: vertical, party, institu-
tions of the labour movement, Stalinism, Trotskyism, Leninism, cen-
tralisation, representative democracy, state and so on. And their 
conclusions are the same: there is no need for any political organisation 
(e.g. a party form organised to take state power) since stakeholders are 
already spontaneously political as in Walzer’s critical associationism. They 
are probably going to collaborate internationally. All that is necessary is to 
provide them with the opportunity to network.
In his “Politische Schriften”, Habermas seems convinced that coopera-
tives can easily associate with each other simply because they are already a 
kind of “workers’ association”. To use his own words, those lower-level 
public spaces that fight against the bureaucratisation and commodification 
imposed by higher-level public spaces (the market and the state) and that 
are immersed in the micro-sectors of daily communication “occasionally 
come together in public debates or intersubjectivities of a higher level 
(…), they can also communicate with each other as soon as the potential 
for self-organisation and self-organised use of the means of communica-
tion is deployed. Forms of self-organisation strengthen the collective 
 ability to act”, the philosopher concludes (1985: 159–160, my transla-







































CASE STUDY ANALYSIS: THE PROBLEM OF REPRESENTATION
What we now need to do is hold this libertarian socialist grammar up 
against the language of the Solidarity Economy Movement (MES) as it is 
actually spoken by some of its key actors.
The Pénélopes Incident
The incident that follows illustrates the paradoxes of refusing to create 
political structures while seeking representation across the movement 
based on a common grammar of action. It concerns the clash between the 
women’s association Les Pénélopes and the MES (the Solidarity Economy 
Movement in France). Representatives of the two organisations met in a 
workshop during the second World Social Forum in Porto Alegre entitled 
“Women in the solidarity economy”.
In a face-to-face interview Martha, President of Les Pénélopes, describes 
the initiation of the network:
Act I: At the first forum in Porto Alegre (January 2001) of Les Pénélopes, 
which had started some 5 or 6 days earlier, we thought “we are not going 
to come to a social forum on the other side of the world without meeting 
potential collaborators”. We had made a start earlier, we had established 
connections. We were already very interested in women’s solidarity- 
economy activity because it is a way of resisting globalisation, patri-
archy, violence, etc. We met two of the cooperatives – it was great! We 
filmed everything, we took pictures of us all together, then we decided to 
set up partnerships with those cooperatives seeing as we are in touch with 
other cooperatives over here. This is act I.
Act II: At the second Porto Alegre forum, we thought: we’re going to set up 
a workshop for these cooperatives to meet … and thus try and start a net-
work. Not a network of representatives, no: of actual active partners. 
And since it’s a world forum, it’s fantastic, there’ll be lots of people from 
all over the world. And indeed there were lots of people, including MES 
people. (They) were very late, they hadn’t proposed a workshop, so 
there was no possibility of their having their own workshop, so she (a 
member of MES, AN) negotiated with Les Pénélopes for them to partici-
pate in our workshop. We said all right but couldn’t agree on a title, so we 
said “we’ll just share the allotted time, you can have an hour and a half”. 
They were first and launched a proper attack on Les Pénélopes (the speaker 
quotes the MES delegate, AN): “it’s outrageous, you cannot set up an inter-
national network in the solidarity economy, it’s much too soon, anyway you’re 
new to the field, you have no previous history in the solidarity economy, we were 
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first in that field”. Imagine! In our workshop! There were people from the 
Brazilian Workers’ Party, feminists involved in the solidarity economy we 
had invited because they were quite interested (those people the speaker 
said they had made friends with during the first forum, AN). And what do 
they do?! They start a dog fight, they take over our right to speak. People 
had come to say things and instead they attended an undignified brawl 
(…). We were very angry (…). This was repeated at the European Social 
Forum and it was just a clash between people.
Les Pénélopes represent another network of actors involved in the soli-
darity economy at an international level, but in competition with the MES. 
The logic of networking suggests that MES members should accept Les 
Pénélopes. However, who in the web of networks can claim to be a “bet-
ter” representative of the solidarity economy? There is no doubt that the 
Brazilian cooperatives, which Les Pénélopes have met and which its presi-
dent is talking about, belong to the solidarity economy, a movement that 
is highly developed in Brazil. They also use a grammar of praxis and action 
rather than one of representation and denunciation (the grammar of the 
Far Left). In addition, the president of Les Pénélopes chairs a cooperative 
in Paris. But this is not enough for those who see MES as the only worthy 
representative of the solidarity economy.
Here is the presentation of the same situation (the workshop in Porto 
Alegre) put forward by Monique, President of MES (and director of a 
community services consultancy in Paris), who was present:
Les Pénélopes, that’s bullshit. We keep having problems with them. In Porto 
Alegre in 2002 we had a workshop with them. It also ended in a fight. Les 
Pénélopes think they speak in the name of solidarity economy actors. I 
say no. You do a lot of things other than the solidarity economy. You do 
feminist activities, theoretical articles against domination and capitalism on 
your website, and so on. If you want us to work together, you do your job, 
but you are not actors, it’s not the same. You can’t represent them (…). At 
that shared workshop we insulted each other. We said “let’s set up a common 
network of women in the solidarity economy”, they said “Les Pénélopes 
must lead it!”. There were 100 people in the room who said “No!” Pénélopes 
can’t lead an international solidarity economy movement”. They went and 
did it anyway. (…). They didn’t care about what had been achieved before. 
It led to the large-scale exchange of abuse (…). I’ve been doing this for 20 
years (working within the solidarity economy), it took me time. I will 
continue, even if there is no Ministry for the Solidarity Economy or its 
subsidies. You see, some people just pop up one morning, and because 











































As we can see, the confrontation in the Porto Alegre Social Forum is 
presented in two different and opposing ways. It is characterised by per-
sonal conflicts. An agreement between the two parties on this issue would 
have considerably strengthened the visibility and cohesion of the solidarity 
economy. Yet personal fallings-out between activists meant that Les 
Pénélopes and the MES turned away from each other without acknowl-
edging that the other organisation could legitimately claim to speak in the 
solidarity economy’s name.
The Médiasol Incident
The clash between the MES and Les Pénélopes was revived when “Les 
Pénélopes” launched a new initiative in 2003: Médiasol (for “Media for 
the Solidarity Economy”).
Médiasol was an Internet portal launched in response to a call for pro-
posals from the French Ministry for the Solidarity Economy.16 The aim 
was to create a communication platform for all actors in the solidarity 
economy. The initiative only lasted for two years. A former employee of 
Médiasol has a lucid explanation for its failure. He accuses the MES lead-
ers of trying to designate the MES as the only legitimate space in which 
the solidarity economy can express itself:
Roger: “As Médiasol employees, what we have come across is an aggressive 
rejection of the project from the MES. (…) We feel that people in the 
MES want to be alone on the visible part of the ‘Solidarity Economy’ 
iceberg. They did not understand what a great tool Médiasol was and 
how they could use it. (…) Yet they could have posted their texts there. 
This was one of the nice things about it: it wasn’t meant just for journalists. 
But they immediately said ‘it’s made by the Ministry for the Solidarity 
Economy, we don’t want it’. We are going to have the European Social 
Forum in November (2003) and people say ‘The problem with the solidarity 
economy is that it’s not visible enough’ (…) They didn’t want to see how 
crucial it is to communicate, to develop tools. If they had had a  communication 
structure when we had to be organised and apply for subsidies we could 
have said ‘hey there! We represent 10% of the country’s economy’ or some-
thing similar. But people didn’t understand that we had to communicate”.
This critique of the MES includes the libertarian criticism of a confisca-
tion of the power of representation. But the same accusation can be found 
in what MES leaders say to account for the boycott of the Médiasol 





































project. The argument that there is an absence of democracy is used to 
accuse Médiasol of attempting a Trotskyite appropriation of the solidar-
ity economy.
Marcel, a member of the MES board and director of a community ser-
vices consultancy, explains:
Médiasol is something they set up with people we couldn’t stand as people 
but also with those who had not been involved in the solidarity economy 
(Les Pénélopes) and who suddenly wanted to carry its banner; this was 
rather odd. Médiasol is a project that was started entirely undemocrati-
cally; it started in some corridor of power, with the Ministry for the 
Solidarity Economy. […] It was shocking – a bad start in terms of visibility. 
(…) It claimed it was something done by actors for actors. But from the 
start it was a closed thing if you didn’t belong to the inner circle [Marcel is 
referring to Martha from Les Pénélopes, who is also employed by the 
Ministry for the Solidarity Economy]. I had a problem with joining 
Médiasol because 1) it wasn’t democratic, 2) I found it annoying that an 
allegedly Far Left organisation [Les Pénélopes] should set up yet another 
channel of communication. I thought: ‘this is one newspaper chain claiming 
an issue that isn’t theirs’. It was politically annoying (…). It was a critical 
analysis of the system and all that. But what did they propose???
The possibility of publishing texts in Médiasol did not appeal to MES 
members. What they wanted was to be recognised as the “tip of the ice-
berg” by the Ministry for the Solidarity Economy. The MES preferred to 
set up their own web portal rather than collaborate on a project with Les 
Pénélopes. Nor is there any doubt that the democratic process which led to 
the creation of Médiasol can be questioned. Martha, the president of Les 
Pénélopes, is affiliated with the Ministry for the Solidarity Economy as 
technical advisor in charge of associative life and cooperatives. But what the 
MES finds most insulting is the fact that they are not included in the 
Ministry’s inner circle, where Les Pénélopes is well established. MES mem-
bers think they are the only ones who can legitimately speak in the name of 
all others. It is, therefore, difficult for them to accept that Les Pénélopes or 
Médiasol can also develop the solidarity economy on a higher meta-level in 
France (Habermas), or indeed on an international scale through their net-
work of cooperatives in Brazil, without relying on the MES.
MES members (Monique, Marcel) use the libertarian socialist grammar 
of praxis to disqualify Les Pénélopes and Médiasol. They accuse them of 








































speak in the name of workers and cooperatives without really allowing 
them to contribute. Les Pénélopes, just like Trotskyists, secretly try to 
assume all the power of the Solidarity Economy Movement by infiltrating 
the Ministry for the Solidarity Economy. They will not let local organisa-
tions (who produce the real solidarity economy through their “praxis”) 
create their own network in a free, democratic and horizontal movement. 
They want to impose a vertical unity from the top down with their media 
platform project. In doing so, they manipulate solidarity economy actors 
just as communist and Trotskyite parties and trade unions—such as the 
French Communist Party (PCF), the Revolutionary Communist League 
(LCR) and the General Trade Union of Workers (CGT)—try to do with 
workers. For the MES leaders, Médiasol is just a webzine containing the 
Pénélopes’ theoretical feminist criticisms of capitalism which do not con-
tain any concrete proposals for building an alternative model of the econ-
omy in practice. And, in the minds of MES leaders, these concrete 
proposals (micro-finance organisations, LETS, CSA, etc.) must be those 
of their own network. As a reminder, the libertarian socialist grammar 
used by the solidarity economy imbues words such as “parties”, “trade 
unions”, “structures of representation”, “federation”, “verbal protest” 
with negative connotations. In embracing these terms, as the MES leaders 
see it, Les Pénélopes and Médiasol neglect the very thing that actually 
constitutes the solidarity economy: concrete praxis.
DISCUSSION
Politics Within the Solidarity Economy: A Corporatist 
Representation of Action?
As I sought to show in the first section, there was a remarkable commonal-
ity in the way that solidarity economy activists and academic researchers 
spoke about their engagement. A common language game was played to 
celebrate the Solidarity Economy Movement as a new horizontal way of 
doing politics (anchored in the local and everyday) against the old vertical 
way relying on political parties and trade unions. The latter were accused 
of re-appropriating the power of representation in the anti-globalisation 
fight. Those connected to the solidarity economy identified themselves in 
contrast to their far-left enemies: for instance, the French Communist 
Party (PCF), the Revolutionary Communist League (LCR) and the 
General Trade Union of Workers (CGT). As one solidarity economy theo-





































rist writes: “the sense of powerlessness that could be overcome thanks to 
the (World and European) Social Fora comes as much from the strength 
of neoliberal ideology as from the questioning of alternative visions too 
thoroughly pervaded by authoritarian traditions. As they claimed a right 
to interpret collective actions and demands they delegitimated any posi-
tion not focused on ‘toppling the system’ (…). By freeing themselves from 
the guardianship of these self-proclaimed keepers of the truth, the Social 
Fora have opened a space where expectations of democratic debate can be 
realised” (Laville 2003: 18–19). In this sense, the aspirations of the anti- 
globalisation fora correspond to those of the solidarity economy cluster.
Having given a theoretical definition of grammar, I have tried to show 
how the concept can be used to formalise the aspiration towards a libertar-
ian way of acting and talking politics (following the libertarian socialist 
philosophy of Lefort, Castoriadis and Holloway).
But the struggles between two organisations, the MES and Les 
Pénélopes, reveal that the Solidarity Economy Movement is much less 
harmonious and messianic than its actors and researchers want to believe. 
Of course, the MES and Les Pénélopes share the same representation of 
the world and use the same language to describe it. Their grammar has the 
same specific lexical rules permitting and forbidding words: “direct 
democracy” rather than “representative democracy”, “public micro- 
spaces” rather than trade unions, local (workers’ or citizens’) political 
power rather than that of a party, spontaneous forms rather than centrali-
sation, network rather than federation, “ordinary citizenship” rather than 
“intellectual apparatchiks”, “libertarian socialism” rather than a commu-
nist state of any kind, whether defined in a Trotskyist, a Leninist, or any 
other way. The grammar also promotes practices of “engaging in eco-
nomic praxis” rather than “verbal protest”, and participating actively in 
the new economy rather than passively contesting the existing one.
The problem is that the MES and Les Pénélopes used this well- 
organised rational discourse to condemn each other within the social 
movement rather than to condemn those who they identify as their com-
mon adversary outside it (the radical and Trotskyite left, capitalism, etc.). 
The MES takes the moral high ground using the grammar of the solidarity 
economy to assert its own legitimacy and to weaken rival networks. Thus, 
its libertarian socialist grammar paradoxically becomes a weapon with 
which to argue for the right to “speak in the name of”. But why, we might 
ask, should the solidarity economy be more legitimately represented by 










































Like the MES, Médiasol describes itself—using concepts drawn from 
the solidarity economy’s socialist libertarian grammar—as a virtual space 
of “direct democracy”, of “ordinary citizenship”, as a “small-scale partici-
pative political world” that involves both civic commitment and a personal 
anchoring in the local solidarity economy project. Yet, their specific use of 
this grammar does not permit concepts such as power, representation, 
delegation and institution, as this would be the language of a political 
programme. The fact that Médiasol appears, from the MES point of view, 
to embody these prohibited concepts makes it unacceptable to a very large 
proportion of actors from the Solidarity Economy Movement and the 
Social Forum. Though we might expect these movements to be a source 
of creativity, mobilisation and renewed modes of thinking, the censoring 
of any language reminiscent of traditional political programmes in their 
official lexicon means that other modes of domination might creep in. 
While their justifications mostly employ a libertarian socialist grammar, 
when it comes to supra-local organisation leaders of both the MES and 
Les Pénélopes (Médiasol) still justify their actions using corporatist regis-
ters that prioritise the preferential treatment of relatives and friends. The 
relationships they create at this meta-level, thus, constitute corporatist 
networks that undermine the democracy they are trying to achieve.
In this sense, in the solidarity economy, as elsewhere in the anti- 
globalisation movement, the tendency to fall back on personal relation-
ships when confronted with the challenge of large-scale political 
organisation is made inevitable by a form of libertarian socialist grammar 
that is only equipped to conceptualise politics as located within the bound-
aries of small circles of friends. Some specialists note how several contem-
porary social movements are indeed organised in this way—as small 
non-hierarchical affinity groups working through consensus—mainly 
underlining their advantages (Snow and Soule 2010: 157–158). Others 
go further and point out the problem with such affinity-based organisa-
tions: the absence of explicit rules can allow an individual or a group to 
exercise unchecked influence (Pleyers 2010: 28). But very few reflect on 
possible solutions to this problem that do not simply reintroduce a gram-
mar of representative democracy or leadership (Morris and Staggenborg 
2007: 170–196).




































The Incompleteness of the Solidarity Economy Grammar: Can 
Praxis and Representative Politics Ever Be Reconciled?
The problem with the solidarity economy in its current multi-faceted form 
was well understood by Castells when he wrote about contemporary social 
movements in the era of globalisation. Its paradoxical ambivalence results 
from its network model: its main strength is “a networking, decentred 
form of organisation and intervention, characteristic of the new social 
movements, mirroring and counteracting the networking logic of domi-
nation in civil society”. On the other hand, “it is the decentred, subtle 
character of networks of social change that makes it so difficult to perceive, 
and identify, new identity projects coming into being” (1997: 362).
Formalising the solidarity economy’s grammar of justification reveals its 
libertarian socialist representation of an ideal world. Associations and 
cooperatives built by actors are seen as forms of non-reflexive, spontane-
ous and democratic micro public space at a very local level. The “on-the- 
ground” experience in local cooperatives must, it is thought, be used as 
the model for constructing a higher organisational level within the Social 
Forum. Actors, therefore, insist on the lexicon of horizontal participation 
and praxis in opposition to abstract and intellectual politics, which mani-
fests in the vertical organisation of far-left parties and trade unions (etc.). 
Sentences involving terms such as “leader” as subject, “represent” as verb 
and “vertical federation” as complement are not grammatically correct in 
the minds of the solidarity economy actors. Moreover, a discourse about 
theoretical political questions is rejected. Because solidarity economy 
activists avoid the explicit exercise of power, it is impossible to “empower” 
any particular political institution or network to describe what an alterna-
tive to capitalism might look like. Because everyone claims to be uninter-
ested in achieving power in any form, the power that does exist is exercised 
informally by leaders through corporatist means.
Because both the MES and Les Pénélopes keep rejecting all political 
forms (parties, trade unions and federations), they refuse any form of 
power. But perhaps Giddens was not entirely wrong when he said that 
Third-Sector organisations must acknowledge the inevitability of power 
and stop seeing its use as inevitably evil. Power, in the broader sense of the 
term, is how we can achieve things. For Giddens, power can be positive 
when it is not used for hoarding caste privileges, but rather takes all citi-







































The question that then arises is the following: how can we suggest a 
way for libertarian socialist organisations to act in a way that is not libertar-
ian in the neoliberal sense? Neoliberal reasoning would argue that nobody 
can have power over anybody else. Any individual actor is free to leave the 
network (or the association) at the slightest vexation (Nozick 1974: 299). 
And this is exactly what happens when cooperatives decide to leave the 
MES network (as did e.g. some consulting services such as the Pôles 
d’économie solidaire). Or when others decide to not join it (as did Les 
Pénélopes) just because of some personal disputes with the MES’ leaders. 
Power is an ordinary disruptive force in the solidarity economy as it is 
everywhere else. In both cases, the MES is losing members because they 
think (rightly or not) that its leaders monopolise the power to “talk in the 
name of”. By either leaving or not joining in the first place, they weaken 
the voice of the solidarity economy more than ever.
On both a national and an international scale, the MES cannot continue 
to proceed as if power did not exist, as in an ideal Aristotelian public micro-
space where everything can be decided and managed by a very small group 
of citizens. This is because, contrary to Habermas’ optimistic depiction, 
there are challenges of political organisation at larger scales that simply do 
not exist—at least not to the same degree—at smaller scales, and meeting 
these challenges requires some engagement with questions of power. How 
to shift from a world where micro public spaces proliferate to produce a 
large common public space? In his discussion of critical associationism, 
Walzer pointed out this problem—the very problem experienced by the 
solidarity economy—by referring to Aristotle: “In his Politics, Aristotle 
argued that justice in a democracy requires the citizens to rule and be ruled 
in turn. They take turns governing one another”. But if this is easy to do 
within a micro public space (agora), “that is not a likely picture of a political 
community that includes tens millions of citizens” (1983: 320).
Because of this scale-related difficulty, Walzer (like Giddens) gives up 
the libertarian socialist idea of the “turn”. What “justice requires is not 
that citizens rule and are ruled in turn, but that they rule in one sphere 
and are ruled in another” (1983: 321). According to Walzer, politics is 
only one sphere of social activity. The economy is another. The problem 
with this conception is that it runs the risk of compromising what the soli-
darity economy achieves: the (citizen) politicisation of the economy.
In my opinion, to have power in one sphere does not necessarily mean 
that actors have to delegate it elsewhere. A real democratic meta-level, 
rather than a corporatist one, could address the “turn” question every-








































where, even on a large scale. How can we make power circulate between 
several hands, resting in each for only a short period of time, in an organ-
isation in which there are more than 20 members?
A possible response could be to ask actors to be aware of that other 
property of their own libertarian socialist tradition, self-management 
(autogestion), and of that tradition’s writings about the rotation of work 
and leadership tasks and about the possibility of removing “collective rep-
resentatives” (Castoriadis 1974 [1952]; Holloway 2010: 44). In the 
1950s, France was struck by large-scale workers’ strikes in the major 
industrial centres (Groux and Pernot 2008). During that large trade- 
union movement, Castoriadis suggested that the Renault workers’ meet-
ing in Paris and St. Nazaire could have joined forces with the metal workers 
in Paris. For this another level of political organisation would have been 
necessary—one that was not a political party or trade union such as the PC 
or CGT, respectively—to connect them with one another and allow them 
to form meta-level delegations (Castoriadis 1974 [1959]: 216–217). 
Castoriadis further suggested that the 50s libertarian socialist group 
“Socialism or Barbarism” should provide support for the construction of 
such an “organisation” and maintain its role in providing a space in which 
“workers can have a voice and exercise power” (1973 [1960]: 95 & 411sq; 
1974 [1952]: 44–47). They could be the “voice” of the movement—but 
only for a short time. In these articles, Castoriadis and friends suggested 
very strong rules to ensure that power alternated between workers within 
Socialism or Barbarism, just as Holloway has done in his more recent the-
ory developed through analysing the Zapatistas’ organisation. Indeed the 
Zapatistas, Holloway writes, “have a system of rapid rotation in the com-
position of their Juntas de Buen Gobierno not just to involve more and 
more people in the self-government of their communities, but also to 
eliminate the dangers of corruption” (2010: 65). Representative mandates 
are also immediately revocable (Lederman 2015: 258)
It is possible to find in the solidarity economy a large part of the origi-
nal libertarian socialist lexicon of Castoriadis and the group “Socialism or 
Barbarism” (ordinary citizenship, to participate, direct democracy, etc.), 
as well as the same opponents (centralised political parties, trade unions 
and any other authority figures). But we can also see that certain terms in 
the solidarity economy grammar as it is really used by actors still preclude 
anarchist ideas such as that of organising power through short-term rep-
resentation and rotation, even though these were embraced by the liber-









































language game badly. Judging by the way in which Castoriadis, Lefort and 
Holloway frame the correct libertarian socialist way of “acting in” and 
“talking about” the world, we should say that they are making grammati-
cal mistakes.
The writings of Castoriadis, Lefort and Holloway in fact articulate a 
pure form of libertarian socialist grammar that uses concepts such as “rep-
resentation”, “power” and “delegation” freely. As Žižek would have said, 
these concepts are perceived by solidarity economy actors as referring to 
malignant properties of political activity. The properties they describe are 
seen as dangerous, and this justifies their elimination. But in the process, 
we divest these things of their very essence.
For an effective political form of libertarian socialist grammar, it would 
be necessary for the malignant properties of political activity (power, rep-
resentation, delegation, etc.) to be known and accepted as inevitable. 
According to Castoriadis, accepting them provides the only chance of 
managing them collectively. By censoring questions of power and repre-
sentation in their theoretical writings, solidarity economy activists have 
deprived themselves of the tools that would enable them to make a power-
ful counter-proposal to capitalist hegemony.
CONCLUSION
My aim in this chapter has been to ask why local-level solidarity economy 
initiatives have consistently failed to join forces to take their professed 
goals of citizen activism and political ontology to a higher level of effec-
tiveness and organisation. To do so, I have summarised the theoretical 
framework and the notion of “grammar” to bring to light the solidarity 
economy’s specific political praxis. I have also examined how actors and 
researchers respect the grammatical rules of the same language game and 
brought to light their philosophical underpinnings.
The language game played in the solidarity economy is more than just 
a way of speaking. It is also a way of seeing and acting in the world that is 
typically “libertarian socialist”. But in analysing the conflicts between the 
MES and Les Pénélopes within the anti-globalisation forum, I have uncov-
ered a fundamental contradiction: although actors and researchers all 
agree that the solidarity economy’s micro-organisations are ontologically 
and locally “political” and anti-authoritarian, these micro-organisations 
do not succeed in managing political disputes (manifest in their justifica-





































tions) at the macro level. I have argued that oral justifications bring to 
light what texts hide: the will to power of representation.
The critique of representation is embodied in the “form of life”, as 
Wittgenstein said, of the solidarity economy’s political grammar. The 
MES and Les Pénélopes accuse each other, using this libertarian socialist 
grammar of justification, of the censored act of “representing”. We have 
seen how accusations of belonging to the Trotskyist or Leninist Far Left 
conceal a genuine struggle over how to organise without compromising 
representation. Paradoxically, actors play the same language game to 
accuse each other of not respecting that game. This renders it impossible 
for the democratic ontology of the solidarity economy on the local level to 
be scaled up to a higher level, whether supra-local, international or global. 
Researchers from these organisations, who use the same grammar, do not 
understand this contradiction.
Academic political theorists who talk about the world using the same 
libertarian socialist language critique the usual forms of representative 
democracy as well. But they do not restrict themselves to critique; they go 
on to address the issue of a “new way of representing”. Yet contrary to this 
formal libertarian socialist model—which can be found in the texts of 
Socialism or Barbarism’s two main contributors as well as Holloway’s 
writings—the grammar used in the solidarity economy forbids the use of 
words such as “delegation”, “representation” and “power”. Thus, any dis-
cussion about how to share power will create tensions. The risk of not 
confronting issues of power is that the solidarity economy becomes a form 
of corporatism worrying to those who would like to give politics a new 
foundation based on participation and initiative. Their arguments are 
always framed within a libertarian socialist grammar that allows them to 
prove how participatory and egalitarian they are at the local level of their 
initiatives (in towns, villages, neighbourhoods). Because the delegation 
involved in political representation contains the risk of a withdrawal of 
power, they all want to keep their own voice within the anti-globalisation 
social movement. There is a symmetry between justifications in which 
each of the movement’s actors quickly accuse others of arbitrarily usurping 
the right to “speak in the name of”. It is being libertarian socialist without 
taking into account certain political properties of libertarian socialist 
thought that leads to this paradox: renewing political commitment at the 
micro level does not solve the problem of how to organise legitimate 








































The solidarity economy—a distinctive and important form of anti- 
globalisation activity—is ontologically “political” by virtue of its powerful 
civic activism. But, to answer Žižek’s question, as long as it does not really 
direct its libertarian socialist spirit towards a libertarian socialist overturn-
ing of the power of representation, the solidarity economy might remain a 
virtual product: a “politics without politics”, or a politics deprived of some 
of its malignant—but essential—properties.
NOTES
1. Associations pour le Maintien d’une Agriculture Paysanne (AMAP): liter-
ally Associations for the Protection of Small-scale Farming—the main form 
of Community Supported Agriculture in France.
2. Cultures en mouvement (http://wbenjamin.canalblog.com), Territoires 
(http://www.adels.org), Economie et humanisme (http://www.devel-
oppements-et-humanisme.eu), Alternatives économiques (http://www.
alternatives-economiques.fr), Médiasol (http://www.Mediasol.org). La 
lettre du Mouvement pour l’Economie Solidaire (http://le-mes.org/M.E.S/
Accueil_MES.html). Pour (http://www.grep.fr/pour). Collective books 
were too numerous to be quoted here. I will just mention the two I use in 
this chapter: MB2, Pour une économie alternative et solidaire. Paris. 
L’Harmattan. Ion, Jacques. ed. L’engagement pluriel. Saint-Etienne: 
Publications de l’Université de Saint-Etienne.
3. The name is an ironic way of saying we are Penelope-like, referring to the 
story of patient, devious Penelope and the suitors in the Odyssey.
4. All names have been changed.
5. Eme, B. 2001, “Les solidarités vécues ou la résistance au système” in Pour, 
172: 189–103.
6. MB2. 2001, Pour une économie alternative et solidaire. Paris, L’Harmattan: 48.
7. Ligue communiste révolutionnaire (renamed, since January 2009, 
Nouveau Parti Anticapitaliste: New Anticapitalist Party).
8. Centrale Générale des Travailleurs: General Workers’ Union.
9. Hersent, M. 2003, “Les dynamiques des forums sociaux” in Cultures en 
mouvement, 62:31–33.
10. MES Executive Committee, 2004, About the General Assembly of the 
23rd April. In La lettre du MES, 12.
11. Ion, J. 2001, “Affranchissements et engagements personnels” in Ion, J., 
L’engagement pluriel, Saint-Etienne: Presses de l’Université de Saint- 
Etienne: 21–45.
12. Socialisme ou Barbarie (Socialism or Barbarism) was a radical libertarian 
socialist group of the post-World War II period based in France (the name 








































comes from a phrase Rosa Luxemburg used in a 1916 essay (“The Junius 
Pamphlet”). It existed from 1948 until 1965. Castoriadis was its most 
prominent leader. It was linked to the Johnson-Forrest Tendency, which 
developed as a body of ideas within American Trotskyist organisations. 
One faction of this group later formed Facing Reality. The early days also 
brought debate with Anton Pannekoek and an influx of ex-Bordigists into 
the group. Socialisme ou Barbarie was composed of both intellectuals and 
workers who wrote in the Journal that had the same name (S or B). They 
agreed that the main enemies of society were the bureaucracies that gov-
erned modern capitalism and soviet socialism (http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Socialisme_ou_Barbarie and Gottraux 1997).
13. In this section of the text Lenin is not mentioned (though maybe he is 
implicitly present in the “and so on”), probably because Holloway dedi-
cates a full chapter to him later on, unlike Trotsky or Stalin.
14. Holloway does not recognise the solidarity economy as a possible breach; 
he expresses fears about this mode of “doing” remaining “economic” 
(2010: 69–70), but he does not realise that several of the initiatives he 
welcomes as “cracks”—from enterprises taken over by their workers to 
community- supported agriculture and community services delivered by 
Italian social centres—are themselves initiatives characteristic of the soli-
darity economy (which all, moreover, engage in the economic activity of 
selling or exchanging goods or services).
15. “Another politics must be based on the critique of the very separation of 
politics from the rest of our everyday activity, on the overcoming of the 
separation of politics from doing (…). Bring [the political] home, to our 
activity, our own doing and the way it is organised, what we do each day” 
(2010: 133–134).
16. Secrétariat d’Etat à l’Economie Solidaire (Ministry for the Solidarity 
Economy).
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